The challenge
Data security is consistently one of the top reasons operators hesitate to connect their plant. Operational technology was historically "secure" by isolation, and the worry is reasonable: connecting machines for visibility could create a path for an attacker to reach the equipment that runs the operation. The brief was blunt — get us the data we need, but do not open a door to our control systems, and do not put our PLCs on the internet.
The core principle: get the data out, never let control in. A monitoring connection should be read-only and outbound-only — the edge device reads the machine and pushes data out; nothing reaches back to the PLC.
Our approach
- Read-only at the edge. The edge device reads from PLCs and sensors without write access, so the connection can't be used to change a setpoint or stop a process.
- No exposed PLC ports. Controllers stay on a protected OT network; the edge device initiates an outbound connection — nothing untrusted connects in.
- Segment OT from IT. Edge devices sit in their own segment behind a firewall — defence in depth, so a problem in one zone can't reach the control layer.
- Encrypt, authenticate, log. Encrypted transport, authenticated outbound-only connections, and role-based access with a full audit trail of who saw what.
- Own the data. SA-region cloud or fully on-premise, with export to CSV/SQL — no lock-in, no data-release fees (the principles in our OT-security guide).